Authored by United States Army Command and General Staff College
National militaries extend operational reach through the use of improved lines of communication and basing. Evidence of Roman roads and fortifications in Gaul reveals a history of physical infrastructure extending operational reach in order to increase the Roman Army’s chance of success.
Three case studies provide a framework for this study. First, Caesar’s legions used Gallic folkways to fight in Gaul from 58-50 BC. Second, the Romans projected all forces for the invasion of Britain over roads in Gaul in 43 AD. Third, from 19 BC until the fall of Rome in the fifth century AD, along the Germanic frontier.
All three periods of Roman operations in Gaul demonstrate the interplay of the components of operational reach. Poor roads and basing restricted Caesar’s potential operational reach in Gaul. The deployment toward Britain over Roman roads in Gaul succeeded due to significant increases in infrastructure. On the static frontiers of the Roman empire, the army greatly reduced the potential momentum of its forces as a trade-off for greater endurance and protection.
Mar 13 2015
1508829780 / 9781508829782
US Trade Paper
8.5″ x 11″
Black and White
History / Ancient / Rome