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Defending Hitler’s Reich: German Ground-Based Air Defenses, 1914-1945

Defending Hitler’s Reich: German Ground-Based Air Defenses, 1914-1945 published on

Authored by The Department of the Air Force

Based on the experience gained in World War I and the technological and organizational developments of anti-aircraft forces in the interwar period, Germany’s political and military leadership entered the Second World War with high expectations for the Luftwaffe’s ground-based air defenses. These expectations were tied to a standard that measured success based simply on the number of aircraft shot down. Despite the success enjoyed by the Luftwaffe’s flak defenses between 1939 and 1945, many Luftwaffe leaders demonstrated a limited understanding of the broader outlines and effectiveness of Germany’s ground-based air defenses. These men repeatedly were guilty of evaluating the performance of the Luftwaffe’s air defenses using a simple binomial equation that compared flak with fighter performance. This myopic focus on fighters versus flak led the Luftwaffe’s leadership consistently to ignore or grossly underestimate the contributions of other elements of the ground-based air defense network. German flak defenses accounted for at least half of American aircraft combat losses during the war and an estimated thirty-seven percent of Bomber Command’s missing aircraft during night raids, while anti-aircraft fire damaged more than 66,000 U.S. bombers and over 9,000 British bombers. Anti-aircraft defenses not only destroyed and damaged aircraft, they also severely degraded bombing accuracy by driving bombers to higher altitudes and inducing evasive maneuvering on the final bomb run. Flak damage also crippled Allied aircraft making them easy prey for Luftwaffe fighters. However, Luftwaffe leaders largely ignored these “hidden” effects by focusing solely on the number of aircraft destroyed. Likewise, they often failed to recognize the outstanding returns achieved by decoy and deception measures at relatively low cost, despite the large number of Allied bombs that fell on these sites. Another example involved the critical support provided by searchlights to night fighter forces at different stages of the conflict, as well as the contributions made by smoke generators and barrage balloons to point defenses. In the end, the Luftwaffe’s ground-based air defenses provided a capable and effective adjunct to the Third Reich’s fighter defenses; a contribution largely ignored or underestimated by both contemporary Luftwaffe leaders and post-war historians of the air war.

Publication Date:
Apr 15 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1511733977 / 9781511733977
Page Count:
570
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / Military / World War II

24.94

The American Defense of Long Island

The American Defense of Long Island published on

Authored by Steven Gunther LCDR

The Continental Congress and General Washington mistakenly inflated the importance of New York City to the cause of the revolution. After racing to beat the British to New York, Washington committed his army to the defense of Long Island, either overlooking or neglecting its critical vulnerabilities. Hopeful of a victory in the fashion of Bunker Hill that could bring an end to the war, Washington and his inexperienced corps of generals led an under-trained, under-equipped, undisciplined force’ into the largest battle of the Revolutionary War against one of the most experienced armies of its time. The subsequent battle was the most lopsided defeat the Continental army suffered during the war and the destruction of the army was prevented only by a daring retreat across the East River.

George Washington decided to defend New York City base on potential political ramifications over military strategy. In doing so, he violated what Clausewitz deemed the supreme act of judgment that a political and military leader must make. Specifically, he failed to determine the kind of war on which they are embarking and not mistake it for, or try to make it something different. Chasing the specter of a decisive victory Washington committed his unprepared forces to an unnecessary task. The resulting defeat set the tone for the rest of 1776 and forced strategic redirection that would ultimately lead to victory.

Publication Date:
Apr 15 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
151173504X / 9781511735049
Page Count:
32
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / United States / Revolutionary War

12.95

The Tullahoma Campaign: Operational Insights

The Tullahoma Campaign: Operational Insights published on

Authored by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College

This book examines the operational insights offered by the analysis of the Tullahoma, or Middle Tennessee, Campaign of 1863. The book uncovers these operational insights by examining how Major General William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Army of the Cumberland, and General Braxton Bragg, commander of the Army of Tennessee, planned for and conducted the nine day campaign. This book of both commanders’ planning and execution of a campaign characterized by maneuver, rather than large scale battles, highlights five important insights into operational warfighting, These insights include the translation of strategic guidance into an operational plan, offensive and defensive operational planning, the importance of deception, there effects of sustainment on an operation, and the influence of leadership on the planning and conduct of a campaign.

Publication Date:
Apr 18 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1511761695 / 9781511761697
Page Count:
198
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / United States / Civil War

12.95

The Mine Run Campaign: An Operational Analysis of Major George G. Meade

The Mine Run Campaign: An Operational Analysis of Major George G. Meade published on

Authored by U.S. Army War College

After the Gettysburg Campaign of the American Civil War in late July 1863, the Union Army of the Potomac, commanded by Major General George G. Meade, pursued the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, commanded by
General Robert E. Lee, south into Central Virginia. There followed a series of maneuvers and engagements as the two commanders jockeyed for position. The Mine Run Campaign constitutes one of these episodes and was conducted during the period 20 October 1863 to 2 December 1863. Little study has been devoted to this rather obscure campaign because of its relatively inconclusive results. However, the campaign does provide a unique opportunity to analyze the actions and thought processes of an army commander at the operational level of war. Since the Mine Run Campaign
was Meade’s first army level offensive operation, this paper is focused on his application of the Operational Art. To that end this study explores the factors that influence the development of the army commander’s intent,
the design of his campaign plan, and the execution of the campaign in combat operations.

Publication Date:
Apr 17 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1511762500 / 9781511762502
Page Count:
86
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / United States / Civil War

12.95

Ulysses S. Grant: The Architect of Victory in the U.S. Civil War

Ulysses S. Grant: The Architect of Victory in the U.S. Civil War published on

Authored by U.S. Army War College, Penny Hill Press

Ulysses S. Grant began his military service in 1839 when he entered the U.S. Military Academy. Upon graduation in 1843, he was assigned to an infantry regiment that was destined for duty in the Mexican War. Grant participated in most of the major Mexican War campaigns and after the War would continue on active duty until 1854. Ten years later, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, Commander in Chief of the Union Army, would conceive and orchestrate the Campaign that ended the Civil War. The purpose of this book is to explore Grant’s development as a military leader by researching his personal correspondence. His understanding of national strategy and the operational level of war was the focus of this work. In addition, Carl Von Clausewitz’s concept of “military genius” was used to analyze Grant’s military intellect. The study revealed that he possessed a sharp military intellect based on common sense and that his understanding of national strategy and the operational art is worthy of study by all military professionals.

Publication Date:
Dec 04 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1519668511 / 9781519668516
Page Count:
58
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / United States / Civil War

12.95

The Spanish Pacification of the Philippines, 1565-1600

The Spanish Pacification of the Philippines, 1565-1600 published on

Authored by U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Penny Hill Press

The last major conquest of the 16th century Spanish period of expansion was the Philippines–a subject that has received little attention and scholarship. This book takes an ethnohistoric approach to explore the issues of how the Spaniards brought about the conquest and pacification of the Philippines; the role of technology; the methods and organization of the Spaniards used in the conquest and pacification; whether customs and conditions within Spanish and pre-Hispanic Filipino society contributed to the ease of the pacification; and whether the complete pacification of the indigenous population was truly brought about, even in part, and, if so, the depth of the pacification. The book outlines current scholarship concerning pre-Hispanic Filipino culture, the development of Hispanic culture to the 16th century, the response of Hispanic cultural and political institutions to experiences in the New World, the motivations and events that led the Spanish to the Philippines, and provides an analysis of the impact of the methods used in the conquest and pacification.

Publication Date:
Dec 05 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1519686706 / 9781519686701
Page Count:
416
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / Military / General

18.95

The Strategic and Political Impacts of Collateral Damage from Strike Warfare

The Strategic and Political Impacts of Collateral Damage from Strike Warfare published on

Authored by Naval Postgraduate School
Edited by Penny Hill Press Inc

It is hard to argue that there is a more prevailing issue than collateral damage when discussing strike warfare today. The outlook of the United States and other militaries regarding bombing operations, particularly concern about collateral damage, is a historically contingent process. This book examines three case studies-the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Kosovo air campaign-to examine the impact of concern about collateral damage on U.S. policy and strategy. It analyzes the disparity between collateral damage effects at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels over the span of a half century. A significant amount of research on the effects of collateral damage from strike warfare focuses on legal, humanitarian, and moral issues. To oversimplify, killing non-combatants is bad, but it happens, and not always by accident. Therefore, it is instructive to gain knowledge on how it affects policy and strategy. Depending on the conflict and time period, U.S. administrations and war strategists have put the priority of mitigating collateral damage at different levels. Understanding the reasoning and timing behind the political and military attitudes toward collateral damage is helpful to understanding how the potential for civilian casualties fits into military strategy as a whole.

Publication Date:
Dec 15 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1522759018 / 9781522759010
Page Count:
68
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / Military / Strategy

12.95

After the Countercoup: Advising the Imperial Armed Forces of Iran

After the Countercoup: Advising the Imperial Armed Forces of Iran published on

Authored by United States Army Command and General Staff College

Iran in the 1950s was in the cross hairs of the Cold War power struggle between the US and USSR. Strategically located, Iran became critical in the foreign policy endeavors of the Eisenhower Administration in the Middle East. After the decision to force Mohammed Mossadeq to retire as the Prime Minister, the United States gave more than $700 million in mutual security assistance to the Shah of Iran from 1953-1959. In addition to the money, the US faced the challenge of transitioning the Iranian Armed Forces from an organization used by Iranian monarchs to quell unrest in the major population centers into a collective security partner with a trained and equipped military that could fight a delaying defensive campaign against a possible Soviet invasion. A Military Assistance Advisory Group was created and advisory efforts began. Iranian history, international rivalries, and the strategic constraints by continuous interference from policy makers in Washington and the Shah’s embellished interests for Iran weighed heavily on the effort. This monograph discusses the strategic context of Iran in the 1950s, the national level deliberations regarding the importance of Iran and the amount of assistance required, and analysis of whether or not the USSR was deterred from intervening in Iran due to the US demonstrable commitment there. This case study parallels future decisions for policy makers as to the future roles and organizations necessary to conduct foreign internal defense and advising the militaries of allied nations. Success or failure at advisory operations has strategic consequences.

Publication Date:
Apr 10 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1511666927 / 9781511666923
Page Count:
74
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / Middle East / Iran

12.95

Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis: Presidential Decision-Making and its Effect on Military Employment During the Kennedy Administration

Bay of Pigs and Cuban Missile Crisis: Presidential Decision-Making and its Effect on Military Employment During the Kennedy Administration published on

Authored by United States Army Command and General Staff College

This study investigates the methods by which President John F. Kennedy arrived at decisions to deploy the military in the conduct of foreign policy. Specifically, the events covered are the Bay of Pigs, which represents the nadir of Kennedy’s foreign policy experience, and the Cuban Missile Crisis, regarded as his high water mark as a world leader. Further, this study examines how effectively Kennedy employed the military once he arrived at the decision to deploy them in pursuit of his policies. President Kennedy served during a period of extraordinary turbulence. His preferred instrument of choice in foreign policy matters was the military. This study explores the maturation of Kennedy’s decision-making process and how its evolution most affected the military. The study focuses on Kennedy’s personality and the Cold War political realities to arrive at an understanding of the decision making mindset of the era. From this point of reference, the measure of effectiveness of Kennedy’s “flexible response” strategy is validated and his employment of the military can be judged a qualified success.

Publication Date:
Apr 10 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1511666951 / 9781511666954
Page Count:
124
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
8.5″ x 11″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / Caribbean & West Indies / Cuba

12.95

Great Warriors: Hannibal Barca and Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus

Great Warriors: Hannibal Barca and Publius Cornelius Scipio Africanus published on

Authored by Air Command and Staff College Air university

Presents a review, analysis and comparison of the military achievements of Hannibal and Scipio during the Second Punic War (219-201 B.C.). Provides the reader of military history with the basis for comparing the importance of strategy and tactics.

Publication Date:
Apr 14 2015
ISBN/EAN13:
1511712376 / 9781511712378
Page Count:
84
Binding Type:
US Trade Paper
Trim Size:
7″ x 10″
Language:
English
Color:
Black and White
Related Categories:
History / Military / Strategy

12.95

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